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Abstract— Advanced embedded system technology is one of the 
key driving forces behind the rapid growth of Cyber-Physical 
System (CPS) applications. Cyber-Physical Systems are 
comprised of multiple coordinating and cooperating components, 
which are often software intensive and interacting with each other 
to achieve unprecedented tasks. Such complex CPSs have multiple 
attack surfaces and attack vectors that we have to secure against. 
Towards this goal, we demonstrate a multilevel runtime safety and 
security monitor framework where there are monitors across the 
CPS for detection and isolation of attacks.  We implement the 
runtime monitors on FPGA using a stream-based runtime 
verification tool called TeSSLa. We demonstrate our monitoring 
scheme for an Autonomous Emergency Braking (AEB) CPS 
system.  
Keywords— runtime monitors, Cyber Physical Systems, stream-
based monitors, FPGA, ARM processor 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) are used in a number of 
safety critical applications and their complexity and 
functionality are increasing rapidly. Applications such as 
robotics, autonomous systems, telemedicine and avionics are 
examples of CPSs becoming more complex, incorporating new 
technology and with varied features. For example, a CPS such 
as a modern automobile has environmental and engine control 
systems, sensors of all types, navigation systems, cameras all 
working together to achieve enhanced driving experiences and 
safety [1]. With the emergence of autonomous vehicle 
operations, the sphere of control with respect to vehicle is 
increased to include awareness and sensing of other traffic. As 
such, the functional and structural complexity of these systems 
is rapidly increasing which can have significant engineering and 
operational impacts.   
With the evolution of technology and emergence of 
autonomous systems and Internet of Things (IOT), new 
challenges such as attacks, faults can occur at multiple levels. 
This necessitates a means of ensuring that the system 
requirements and design assurance are carried further down to 
the implementation stages. A potential solution is runtime 
monitors that observe system behavior and provide assurance of 
safety and security without interfering with the system under 
observation [1]. 
Modern embedded digital devices have evolved to the point 
where all types of heterogeneous processing and data mobility 
reside within a single platform or chip from low-level onboard 
sensor pre-processors to dedicated network communication 
cores. The integration of customizable system on a chip 
technology and flexible communication enables tight integration 
with the physical world. However, CPS architected from this 
technology are increasingly vulnerable to design flaws, software 
flaws, and security threats at multiple levels that span both 
hardware and software implementations. Given that 
computation and data processing vulnerabilities may exist at 
multiple levels in embedded CPS, it follows that solutions 
should be present at the levels where the faults or vulnerabilities 
originate. We assert that a viable approach to this problem is to 
employ runtime security and safety monitoring at these various 
levels of processing and integration.  
Our heterogeneous multilevel runtime monitors placed 
across the CPS, observe streams of information coming from the 
CPS and verify that the operation is within the expected safety 
and security bounds. We implement our runtime monitors using 
a stream-based verification tool called TeSSLa [2]. The runtime 
monitors are on a separate platform and isolated from the system 
being monitored to ensure that they do not interfere with the 
CPS. Our target CPS under observation is an Autonomous 
Emergency Braking (AEB) controller, which is a part of the 
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) found in most 
modern vehicles [3]. The functioning of the autonomous 
features can be affected by attacks on the sensors, attack on the 
networks through which the AEB communicates with other 
Electronic Control Units (ECU) in a vehicle or attack on the 
AEB computational unit itself.  In order to detect and isolate 
attacks in CPSs we propose a multilevel monitor framework. 
The contributions of this paper are: 
1) A novel multilevel monitoring framework for runtime 
safety and security monitoring of CPSs. 
2) Implementation of runtime monitors on FPGA using 
stream based runtime verification tool 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
 
A CPS is often comprised of numerous integrated 
components and subsystems interacting and communicating 
with each other to satisfy system level goals. These goals are 
often related to the functional performance, safety and security 
of the service a CPS is providing – example being, an 
automobile cruise control that will always disengage when the 
brake is applied. Numerous work in literature have considered 
runtime monitors to ensure such operational safety and security 
properties of CPS. Reference [4] presents a survey of runtime 
monitoring architectures  in distributed real time systems by 
providing three monitor architectures namely BUS, single 
process and distributed process architectures. Reference [5] 
provide a runtime monitoring framework to monitor black-box 
components in COTS processors. They use the bus monitor 
architecture where an external monitor can be used as a system 
component, which can silently receive messages over a system 
BUS without intrusion. Reference [6] integrates run time 
monitoring in an automotive development workflow and 
explores using this in autonomous systems. Reference [7] uses 
safety guards that are inbuilt runtime enforcers that ensure that 
the system satisfies predefined properties even under malicious 
attack. These papers emphasize the need for runtime monitors 
for safety critical CPSs. 
Having multiple local and global monitors  in a vehicle to 
ensure safety is proposed by [8]. A comprehensive review of 
various attacks surfaces, safety failures present in hardware, 
communication and processing levels for autonomous vehicles 
is presented in [9] and [10]. This motivates our proposed idea of 
having multiple monitors across various levels in a CPS to detect 
attacks. 
III. FORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF MONITORING FRAMEWORK 
We discuss typical attacks on a CPS to motivate the 
development of the monitoring framework. We then describe 
the formalism for a single monitor, extend it to multilevel 
monitors and finally explain the necessity for such a multilevel 
monitoring scheme. We also present a threat model for 
Autonomous Emergency Braking (AEB) System, which is the 
representative system for monitoring in our paper. 
 
A. Attacks on CPS 
Typically, the attacks on a CPS can often be classified into three 
domains: a. Low level attacks on hardware/firmware devices. 
These include attacks on sensor (e.g. sensor spoofing that could 
result in signal delay or missed information, firmware attacks 
etc.) or actuator attacks. b. Attacks on connection/network layer 
(e.g. CAN Bus in cars) that include Denial of Service (DoS), 
packet injection, eavesdropping, etc. c. Attacks on the 
computational elements (e.g. malware injection, control flow 
attack, buffer overflow etc.) that affect the proper functionality 
of any CPS subsystem.  
 
 
Fig. 1:Attack surface in Cyber Physical Systems. 
Given such attacks can happen at multiple levels in a 
CPS as shown in Fig. 1, it is necessary to have monitors at 
multiple levels to ensure more classes of faults/attacks can be 
detected and isolated before they propagate through the system 
causing disastrous consequences.  
B. Single Monitor Model 
A monitor 𝑀𝑀 observes streams of information from the CPS. 
Such information could be discrete or continuous time states, 
sensor data or other states that we view from a historical 
perspective i.e. starting from the current state of the CPS to 
states previous in time, or past temporal observations. Each 
stream can be a sequence of inputs or outputs to and from the 
CPS or sub-system within the CPS. We denote the 𝑘𝑘th prefix for 
past 𝑚𝑚 instances of an infinite stream, 𝑠𝑠 as  
𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 = (𝑠𝑠 (𝑘𝑘 − 𝑚𝑚), …, 𝑠𝑠 (𝑘𝑘 − 2), 𝑠𝑠 (𝑘𝑘 − 1), 𝑠𝑠(𝑘𝑘))  
Hence, at time 𝑘𝑘 the stream contains information of the past 𝑚𝑚 
instances starting with 𝑠𝑠 (𝑘𝑘 − 𝑚𝑚) and ending at the current 
instance (𝑘𝑘). The language of the monitor is defined by the set 
of monitored streams,  
𝑤𝑤 =𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘, 𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘, 𝑆𝑆1𝑘𝑘, 𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘, …, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘, where  
• 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 the input stream,  
• 𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 the output stream,  
• 𝑆𝑆1𝑘𝑘, 𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘, …, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 the states of the system from current 
time 𝑘𝑘 for the past 𝑚𝑚 instances. We note that it 
sometimes suffices to monitor a specific relationship 
between the input and output stream to ensure there 
are no faults or security violations. In such cases, we 
may not need to deduce any specific internal state of 
the system. 
 
Assuming that all security violations or faults in the system are 
observable in the monitored stream 𝑤𝑤 (which could be an input/output stream or state), the monitor 𝑀𝑀 makes safety 
and security assessments on the CPS based on a detection 
predicate. We extend the single monitor framework to multiple 
monitors to ensure timely detection of attacks at the point of 
vulnerability.  
C. Monitors at Multiple Levels 
The single monitor 𝑀𝑀, is extended to comprise of monitors at 
multiple levels (Fig. 2) and denoted as the set 𝑀𝑀 = (𝑀𝑀1, 𝑀𝑀2, …, 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀). Each monitor looks at different streams of information 
coming from the CPS or its subsystem. Thus, the monitored 
stream will be w1=𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘1, 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘1, 𝑆𝑆1𝑘𝑘1, 𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘 1, …, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘1 
         w2=𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘2, 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘2, 𝑆𝑆1𝑘𝑘2, 𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘 2, …, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘2 …. 
         wn=𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘n, 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘n, 𝑆𝑆1𝑘𝑘n, 𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘 n, …, 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘n  
Where w1. w2… wn are the streams monitored by 1st, 2nd, …nth 
monitor.  
 
In our simplified monitor architecture in this paper, we consider 
monitors at two levels, 𝑀𝑀1 (Data Monitor in Fig. 2) verifying 
the information integrity of the CPS, and 𝑀𝑀2 (Functional 
Monitor in Fig. 2) verifying the overall functionality of a sub-
system of the CPS such as the control unit. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Cyber Physical Systems with Multi-level Monitors. 
D. Rationale for multilevel monitoring 
 
While the previous subsection extended monitoring from one 
monitor to a multiple monitor, this sub-section explains why we 
are locating monitors at different physical levels. Consider the 
simplified CPS in Fig. 2 that has monitors at two layers or 
levels: M1 monitors the data measured or sensor value and M2 
monitors the functioning of a controller. An attack on level A 
(Fig. 1) is detected by monitor M1 at that level but is typically 
undetected by a monitor M2 (Fig. 2) at the level B. Similarly, 
an attack on the level B is detected by M2 but is typically 
undetected by M1 in the level A. Therefore, unless there are 
monitors at both these levels (irrespective of whether one can 
have single or multiple monitors at each level), a potentially 
dangerous attack may go undetected. Thus, having multiple 
such local monitors at each critical level helps provide more 
comprehensive coverage of the attack surfaces. 
E. Threat Model for Autonomous Vehicles 
Autonomous vehicles which rely heavily on a variety of sensors 
and network connectivity for their self-driving intellect, poses 
several attack surfaces that can be exploited by attackers to 
compromise their safety and the data privacy of passengers. 
GPS, Lidar and Camera sensors, Bluetooth connectivity, 
Infotainment systems, On Board Diagnostics (OBD) port and 
the vulnerable ECUs themselves are potential attack surfaces in 
Autonomous vehicles [11]. Autonomous vehicles rely a lot on 
Lidars and Camera sensors for sensing its environment and 
making driving decisions and hence these attack surfaces are a 
major threat to Autonomous Vehicle safety. Lidar spoofing 
which is possible with an attacker’s precisely controlled light 
source can lead to misguiding the vehicle about obstacles 
around it thereby resulting in unexpected vehicle behavior 
including emergency braking and frozen vehicle conditions 
[12]. Spoofing the camera sensors could cause vehicles to 
misinterpret traffic signs and speed limits resulting in 
dangerous driving conditions for passengers. Attacks on the 
GPS through GPS spoofing (which involves false signals of the 
same structure and frequency as of the authentic GPS signals 
being transmitted by an adversary’s transmitter equipment) can 
have several impacts including giving incorrect information to 
the camera and causing several problems including diverting 
the vehicle from its intended route.  
 Man-in-the-middle attacks can exploit the On-board 
diagnostics (OBD) port in the cars to make the ECUs operate 
incorrectly or erase the stored information in ECUs by sending 
special commands through CAN bus and even reprogram the 
ECUs with malicious code. In this way, attackers can 
accomplish Denial of Service attack by disabling the ECU’s 
participation in the CAN bus communication through 
unauthorized usage of commands on OBD II port. Bluetooth 
interface along with an insecure infotainment system in a 
vehicle is another potential attack surface that allows attackers 
to access private information in devices connected or paired 
with the vehicle Bluetooth. Hackers try to exploit software 
vulnerabilities such as Buffer Overflow, missing stack 
defenses, improper error handling etc. in Electronic Control 
units to feed in malicious inputs and affect their operation or the 
CAN bus transmissions through indirect physical (USB, OBD) 
or remote access (WIFI, Bluetooth) [10] [13]. 
The Data monitors at the inputs and outputs help 
detect any incorrect data, signal delays and missed information 
due to signal spoofing or component failure. The Functional 
monitors at the ECUs would detect any attack such would cause 
change in system functionality. We will study our monitoring 
approach for a representative Autonomous Emergency Braking 
system where the plant and sensors are in MathWorks Simulink 
[14], while the controller is implemented on a 
STMicroelectronics CORTEX M4 microcontroller [15]. 
Runtime monitors are implemented on a FPGA to verify the 
working of the AEB system.  
IV. REPRESENTATIVE CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEM : 
AUTONOMOUS EMERGENCY BRAKING (AEB) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Schematic of an Autonomous Emergency Braking (AEB) system 
showing the AEB controller, plant, sensors. Monitors that can be placed at 
various levels are also indicated. 
Our representative system, which we monitor at multiple levels, 
is a simplified Autonomous Emergency Braking (AEB) system 
taken from the MathWorks Simulink examples library [14]. 
Fig. 3 shows an abstract view of the AEB system. Here the 
output of the AEB controller determines the braking state that 
decelerates the ego car (Ego car is the car with autonomous 
features). The dynamics of the car under this braking condition 
is modeled by the Vehicle Dynamics PLANT module whose 
output along with the scenario under consideration (explained 
later) determines the inputs to the radar and vision sensors. The 
output of these sensors are fused to estimate the relative 
distance and relatively between the ego car and Most Important 
Object (MIO). Note the MIO is not always the lead car. For 
example, if a pedestrian comes in front of the ego car, this 
would be the MIO.   
Based on these inputs (such as relative distance and 
velocity to the MIO), the AEB controller estimates the braking 
state as summarized by Fig. 4(a). When the ego car is still at a 
safe distance but getting closer than a threshold for safe 
operation, an alert is issued. It the driver does not brake or the 
braking is insufficient, then at a certain critical relative distance, 
the AEB engages the stage I partial braking. If this does not 
suffice, a closer relative distance stage II partial braking is 
applied and then full braking is engaged. This decelerates the 
car to avoid collision. Avoiding near collision or a collision 
with a pedestrian is characterized by having a minimum 
headway distance when the velocity of the ego car reaches zero 
as shown in Fig. 4 (a). 
The simulation scenario we consider is as following 
(from the Simulink library in [14]): The model plant (ego car) 
follows a lead car with a vehicle(s) on the side lane as shown in 
Fig. 4 (b). The vehicle(s) covers a pedestrian from the ego car’s 
sensors till he/she crosses in to the lane of the ego car. The 
sensors: both camera and radar locate the pedestrian and the 
sensor information is fused to calculate the time needed to stop 
the car. When this is below a certain threshold, the driver is 
alerted and if sufficient braking action is not taken, as the object 
draws closer, the AEB initiates a first, then second stage partial 
braking, followed by full breaking. Thus, prevents collision 
with the target. In this paper, we perform monitoring at two 
levels to ensure the AEB system works correctly. First, we 
check the integrity of the sensor input using Data Monitors 
(DM) which ensure that the sensor inputs are within the safe 
operating bounds. Second, we verify the AEB controller 
functionality by Functional Monitors (FM) and verify that 
based on the inputs received by the AEB, the overall 
functionality satisfies all the properties of the AEB.  
 (a) 
(b)  
 
 
Fig. 4. (a) Schematic showing the headway (distance between the ego car and 
lead car) and various stages of autonomous breaking initiated. (b) Depiction of 
a scenario in the Simulink simulation (an example in their library that we used) 
where there are two vehicles ahead of the ego car but on the next lane to the 
right. They conceal a pedestrian who is crossing from right to left until he/she 
is in on the same lane as the ego car. Both figures are based on illustrations in 
Simulink that have been adapted and modified here. 
Thus, our multilevel monitoring of the CPS spans: (i) 
an AEB (controller) implemented on Cortex M microprocessor; 
and (ii) the plant (car dynamics), sensor and sensor fusion 
modeled in MATLAB Simulink.  
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
We implement the runtime monitors for the AEB system 
initially at the model level in MathWorks Simulink where the 
monitors are used in FPGA in loop (FIL) mode [16]. Streams 
of information are input to the monitors from the Simulink 
model. The runtime monitors are generated using a stream-
based runtime verification tool called TeSSLa [2]. After 
evaluating the monitors at the model level, we implement the 
AEB controller on an ARM Cortex M4 processor and verify the 
safety and security properties using TeSSLa monitors. 
A. Generation of Monitors 
The TeSSLa tool is ideally suited for specifying and 
verification of properties of CPS.  This is because TeSSLa is a 
real-time specification language and operates on independent 
streams of data that are time-stamped. For example, consider 
three streams of data: p(t), q(t) and r(t). Since these are values 
of the data at different discrete points in time, we denote a 
stream as p (1), p (2), p (3) … p(n). Using TeSSLa, we can 
easily implement conditions such as the following:  
If p(n) > q(n), then r(n+2) =5. 
This simply means that if at any instant of time the data (value) 
of stream “p” is greater than that of stream “q”, the value of the 
data in steam “r” after two instants should be “5”. Thus, it is 
well suited for real-time online monitoring of relationship 
between various streams of data. 
Such stream runtime verification (SRV) can check logical 
properties and compute temporal metrics and statistics from the 
trace [17]. There are many library functions in TeSSLa listed in 
[18] that allow such logical properties to be specified and 
synthesized on an FPGA to implement different monitoring 
conditions. An example of a TeSSLa specification for a 
requirement “increase or decrease in position x over a time 
period of one second should be less than or equal to 5 m” is as 
shown in Fig. 5. This condition can be stated succinctly as: 
|x(n) - x(n-1) | <= 5 
We see that as x goes from 1 m to 5 m between t= 0 and 1 s 
and again from 5m to 10 m between t= 1 and 2 s, this condition 
is met. Therefore, there is no attack (attack=false).  However, 
as x goes from 15 m and 100 m between t=3 and 4 s and again 
from 100 m to 20 m between t=4 and 5 s, this condition is not 
met. Therefore, there is an attack detected (attack=true) for two 
consecutive seconds.  A snippet of the TeSSLa specification for 
this property is in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Stream of data indicating position “x” in blue with time stamp (top) 
and monitor indicating whether an attack has occurred (bottom). 
 
Fig. 6. Snippet of the TeSSLa specification. 
Verilog code synthesizable on FPGA can be generated from the 
TeSSLa specification and used as runtime monitors.  
B. Implementation and evaluation of Monitors 
In this section, we first discuss the implementation of monitors 
on the FPGA that perform runtime monitoring of the AEB 
system running on Simulink. In the second part, we implement 
the AEB controller on an ARM Cortex M4 processor and 
directly monitor it’s functioning with a monitor on FPGA, 
while the plant and sensor (continue to be simulated on 
Simulink as we do not have a physical car with sensors) and 
data integrity is also monitored by the FPGA. 
 
1) Hardware setup for AEB at Model Level 
Both the plant with sensors and the AEB controller are 
implemented at the model level. Input and output streams from 
different sub-systems of this model are fed in real time to FPGA 
in the loop (FIL) as shown in the Fig. 7. These information 
streams are monitored on the XILINX Zynq-7000 XC7Z010- 
1CLG400C FPGA by implementing different monitors using 
TeSSLa. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Schematic showing the AEB controller, plant and sensors 
simulated on Simulink Model and Data Integrity of Sensors and 
Functionality of AEB Controller monitored by FPGA in the loop 
(FIL). 
To keep the implementation simple, we chose one 
monitor at each level: Data and Functional. Attacks that can 
happen at each of these levels and the specific property 
monitored are described. Finally, we demonstrate why it is 
necessary to have separate monitors at both these physical 
levels. 
 
a) Data Monitor: 
The AEB system uses a combination of vision and radar sensors 
to estimate dynamic quantities such as ego vehicle speed, 
relative speed and relative distance between the ego vehicle and 
MIO.  These estimated quantities can be corrupted, the sensors 
can be attacked or spoofed. For example, [19] showed that 
relatively inexpensive LIDAR spoofing devices could trick it 
into “sensing” a non-existent obstacle 20 to 350 m from the 
LIDAR unit.  
In this work, we do not get into the details of whether 
such an attack is specifically made on the physical sensor or at 
the sensor fusion or corruption of data elsewhere. As far as the 
attack on this AEB system is concerned, the result is an 
erroneous change in relative distance or velocity between the 
ego car and the MIO.  
As an example, we change the relative velocity by 
performing two attacks, one at t=3.1 seconds and the other at 
4.4 seconds as shown in Fig. 8. The AEB controller is able to 
compensate for this attack, we therefore do not see an 
appreciable change in the headway, and eventually a collision 
is avoided. However, even this attack (with relatively minor 
effect on the overall AEB system performance) is detected by 
our monitoring condition: Magnitude of change in velocity by 
more than 10 m/s in 1 second is due to an attack. Since, the 
sampling is performed every 0.1 second this translates to  
| u (n + 1) – u (n) | < 1 m/s. 
 
In other words, when continuously monitoring the stream of 
information for the estimate of relative velocity, any jump in 
velocity (increase or decrease) more than 1 m/s between two 
successive data points in this stream is indicative of an attack 
on the system. Fig 8. (d) shows that the Data monitor detects 
both the attacks on the relative velocity. However, neither of 
the attacks are detected by the Functional monitor (described 
next) as an attack on the relative velocity does not change the 
functionality of the AEB controller and is therefore, not 
detected by the Functional monitor.  
 
b) Functional Monitor:  
The AEB controller receives various inputs from the sensor 
fusion (e.g. relative distance and velocity) and uses it to 
calculate quantities such as the Time To Collision (TTC), 
partial breaking-1-time, partial breaking-2, etc. Based on the 
relationship between these input quantities, the AEB controllers 
calculates the level of braking (stage 1, 2, 3), if any, needed to 
prevent a collision. There are several attacks that can occur on 
the functioning of the AEB controller, but like in the sensor 
scenario, we are less concerned with the exact modality of the 
attack. Ultimately, the consequence of such attacks is that the 
AEB controller fails to function in its normal way. For example, 
the AEB controller would fail to apply the braking condition-2 
(more deceleration) or complete braking, when the partial 
braking condition-1 (less deceleration) does not suffice to 
prevent a collision. This is shown in Fig 9. When the condition:  
TTC < 0 & |TTC|< PB2 stopping time is met, the controller 
should be applying partial braking-2. However, even though 
this condition is met at t=2.7 seconds and the condition is 
identified (Fig 9. d) the brake state fails to go from “1” to “2” 
(Fig 9. c). This leads to the headway eventually reaching zero, 
i.e. a collision occurs. Again, this attack is successfully detected 
by the monitoring condition as see in 9 (f).  The monitoring 
condition is  
 
 TTC < 0 & | TTC |< PB2 => AEB Braking status >= 2. 
 
Again, since this is a failure in the functional 
relationship between the input and output of the AEB controller 
and not a data attack (sudden change in relative velocity for 
example), it is not detected by the Data Monitor.  
 
c) Summary: Data and Functional Monitors   
We have shown that an attack on the sensor and actuator data 
can only be detected by a Data Monitor and similarly an attack 
on the functioning of the AEB controller is only detected by the 
Functional monitor. In this model, the AEB controller braking 
output is directly sent to the plant and the sensor outputs are 
directly sent to the AEB controller. In real cars, this information 
is transmitted through the CAN Bus and therefore a monitor is 
also required at the communication level to identify delays in 
transmitting information, etc. 
 
 
 
(2)Hardware Setup for AEB on ARM Cortex M4 processor 
 
We implement the AEB controller on a STMicroelectronics 
ARM Cortex M4 processor and directly monitor it’s 
functioning using on monitors on the FPGA, while the plant and 
sensor (continue to be simulated on Simulink as we do not have 
a physical car with sensors). Data integrity is monitored by the 
FPGA as shown in Fig. 10 in Simulink FIL mode. Any internal 
data or system states that we may need for monitoring was 
obtained by instrumenting the source code. ARM Coresight 
 
Fig. 8.  Attack on relative velocity between ego car and MIO (b) Headway without attack and (c) with above attack (d) Both 
attacks on relative velocity detected by the Data monitor but are not detected by the Functional monitor. 
Fig. 9. (a) Time to collision (TTC) between ego car and MIO (b) Partial Breaking-2 (PB2) stopping time (c) AEB controller output that determines 
braking status (d) Checking if a relationship between TTC and PB2 holds (e) Headway approaches zero implying collision (f) Both attacks on relative 
velocity detected by the Data monitor but are not detected by the Functional monitor. 
 
Architecture has a debug module called Instrumentation Trace 
Macrocell (ITM), which can be used to get actual values of 
variables that can be used to access system behavior with 
minimal intrusion to its working. ITM has 32 stimulus channels 
through which data to be monitored can be written. ITM can 
also perform Printf like debugging by writing data to the 
stimulus ports [20] [21].  
The data obtained from the ITM module can be read 
either through a 4 pin Trace Port Interface Unit (TPIU) or 
through a Serial Wire Output (SWO) pin of a 2 pin Serial Wire 
Debug (SWD) port in the ARM processor [22]. In this paper, 
we use the SWD interface to read data traces due to ease of 
availability of decoders for this interface. But, one can always 
use the TPIU interface or the Aurora Gigabit Trace to get better 
performance. The Aurora trace unit can be used to get data of 
higher bandwidth more securely as it has Cyclic Redundancy 
Checks (CRCs) incorporated in them [23].  
Fig. 10 shows the test bed that was used to monitor the 
traces on ARM processor. The STM32-MAT feature from 
MathWorks Simulink [24, p. 32] enables us to extract trace data 
for monitoring while the processor is running in Processor in 
Loop (PIL) mode in Simulink. In this setup, the processor 
communicates with Simulink through UART ports. The UART 
ports are used to receive sensor inputs and send controller 
output to the plant in Simulink. 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Schematic showing the AEB controller implemented on an ARM 
Cortex M4 processor monitored by the FPGA, plant and sensors simulated on 
the Simulink model and monitored by the FPGA. 
d) Example of property monitored on the AEB controller 
using traces obtained from ARM processor 
 
The data traces obtained from ARM ITM module were decoded 
by the FPGA monitor and used for checking the properties. The 
results were viewed in the Integrated Logic Analyzer debug 
cores on the FPGA [25].  
 
Consider a new monitoring condition that we implement here. 
It is based on the understanding that when the AEB controller 
is in any stage of partial or full braking (AEB status =1, 2, 3) 
the Forward Collision Warning (FCW Active) should be “1”. 
We input FCW Active (top row in Table 1) and AEB Status 
(bottom row in Table 1) as shown. The monitoring condition is: 
[AEB Status = (1, 2 or 3)] => [FW Active =1] 
Based on this condition the expected monitor outputs are shown 
in the bottom row of Table 1. FCW Active =0 when AEB Status 
=1 is erroneous and indicative of an attack that should result in 
Monitor =0.  
 
Table 1. Input streams from Cortex M processor to FPGA and output 
stream from the FPGA monitor. 
FCW Activate 0 0 1 1 
AEB Status 0 1 1 2 
Monitor 1 0 1 1 
 
The Property based on data derived and decoded from ARM 
Core site ITM Trace in Fig. 11 shows that the TeSSLa monitor 
results viewed in Xilinx Integrated Logic Analyzer.  
C. Resources for FPGA implementation of Monitors 
 
Resources utilized by a TeSSLa monitor is summarized in 
Table 2. This could vary depending on the specification. For 
our monitoring conditions, the slice registers account for less 
than 1% and LUTs account for less than 2% of the Xilinx Zynq-
7000 XC7Z010-1CLG400C FPGA.  Resource utilization with 
other blocks (ARM data trace decoders, not shown in the table) 
require negligible resources. 
 
Fig. 11. Property based on data derived and decoded from ARM Core site ITM Trace. This checks for the condition that when AEB Status is 1, 2, 3 (i.e. 
not equal to “zero”, the warning FCW Active must be “1”. The top right sub-figure has AEB Status=1 but the FCW Active =0, indicating a violation of 
the property (case highlight in red). NOTE: I each sub-plot: tesslaInA corresponds to the input stream vale FW Active and tesslaInB corresponds to the 
input stream vale AEB Status, while tessla_OutputValue0 corresponds to the monitor. tessla_OutputValue0  (i.e. Monitor value =0 implies an attack has 
occurred).  
 
Table 2. Resource Utilization for one TeSSLa property 
 
 
If we had 100 such ECUs in a car [26]  of which 10% are safety 
critical, even monitoring all of these 10 safety critical ECUs 
will take less than 30% of the FPGA resources proving this 
concept is scalable. To prevent single point failures assuming 
three redundant monitoring conditions per ECU (instead of just 
one) the FPGA resource utilization would be less than 90%. A 
high-end FPGA [27] which has more resources than the Zynq-
7000 XC7Z010-1CLG400C FPGA, would use only a small 
fraction of its resources. Such an FPGA could therefore manage 
more stringent, complex and resource intensive properties 
easily. This shows that the proposed multi-level monitoring 
concept is scalable. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We proposed a multilevel runtime monitoring approach where 
monitors are placed across different levels of a CPS to ensure 
timely detection and isolation of attacks. Such an approach was 
tested in MathWorks Simulink and implemented on FPGA 
hardware using stream-based runtime monitoring framework 
called TeSSLa. We use the ARM coresight debug and trace 
capability to extract data traces for monitoring. Finally, we 
show that this approach is scalable to a large number of ECUs. 
In future, we would like expand monitoring to include 
execution monitoring to our multilevel monitoring framework 
using ARM Coresight Execution Trace Macrocell (ETM) and 
Program Trace Macrocell (PTM) modules to monitor control 
flow attacks. Further, we plan to verify the completeness of 
monitors using property based fault injection.  
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